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Abstract 
This article examines how the emergence of ‘illiberal democracy’ in Hungary and Poland 
has impacted the behaviour of these two countries in the EU’s international development 
policy making processes. Adapting Hirschmann’s concepts of voice, exit and loyalty, the 
article argues that three factors may have undermined the loyalty of these member states 
towards EU development policy, increasing the likelihood of them using more extreme 
forms of voice (vetoes) or even enact partial exits from the policy area. Erosion of loyalty 
is seen to be more likely if (1) illiberalism actually impacts bilateral development policies 
in the two countries; (2) they have poor track records in influencing EU development 
policy; and (3) alternatives to EU level action emerge. Applying this framework, a greater 
erosion of loyalty is expected in the case of Hungary than for Poland. Hungary’s recent 
actions in EU development policy are in line with the expectations from the framework: it 
has increasingly been using more extreme forms of voice following the 2015 refugee crisis, 
while Poland has been a less ‘problematic’ member state in the policy area. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since their accession to the EU, the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have 
showed little interest in international development cooperation. Creating bilateral 
development policies was a condition for accession, which all CEE countries did after the 
turn of the Millennium, albeit with relatively small and underfunded policies (Szent-Iványi 
and Lightfoot 2015). Even in 2016, the eight CEE countries which joined the EU in 2004 
only provided about 1.4 billion dollars in total development aid, which was less than the 
amount provided by Austria alone (OECD 2018). The CEE countries also became 
contributors to the EU’s international development efforts, giving them some material 
interest in the policy area. Despite this, efforts from the CEE countries to influence the EU 
development cooperation have been limited, and often restricted to niche issues, such as 
supporting democratic transitions. 
 
Some of the CEE countries, especially Hungary and Poland, have increasingly been drifting 
towards more ‘illiberal’ domestic politics in the past years under nationalist/populist 
governments. This emerging illiberalism has led to several instances of confrontation 
between these two countries and the EU. EU institutions have been highly critical of policy 
developments in Hungary and Poland, but have generally been powerless to reign in the 
authoritarian tendencies of the two governments. While the European Parliament has 
voted to start procedures under Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) against 
Poland (in 2017) and Hungary (in 2018), which carries the threat of suspending their 
voting rights in the Council, actual sanctions remain unlikely. The EU is increasingly 
portrayed by both governments as an outside power interfering in domestic affairs, and 
thus a force that needs to be contested and stopped.  
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate what this shift towards illiberalism in Hungary and 
Poland means for the EU’s international development cooperation policy. Are the two 
countries becoming problematic partners in this policy area, or do they continue to behave 
as the ‘uninterested followers’ they have mostly been since their accession? The paper 
uses a framework based on Albert Hirschmann’s (1970) classic concepts of voice, exit and 
loyalty, which have already been adapted fruitfully to explain various processes of 
European disintegration (Vollard 2014; Jachtenfuchs and Kasack 2017). We argue that 
there are three factors which may undermine the loyalty of member states towards EU 
development cooperation, and thus increase the likelihood of these states ‘making trouble’ 
by using more extreme forms of voice (vetoes) or enacting partial exits from the policy 
area. Loyalty will be eroded if (1) the illiberal shift in domestic politics is reflected in 
bilateral development cooperation practices; (2) if the member states have a poor track 
record of influencing EU development cooperation; and (3) alternatives to acting within 
the EU emerge. 
 
Applying this framework, there are reasons to expect lower levels of loyalty from Hungary 
than from Poland: the illiberal shift seems to have had a larger impact on Hungary’s 
international development policy than in case of Poland, and Poland has potentially been 
more influential in EU development cooperation. Alternatives to acting within the EU 
however are relatively scarce for both countries. When comparing the actual behaviour of 
the two countries in the EU’s development policymaking processes, we find that Hungary 
has been using stronger forms of voice, such as vetoes, more frequently than Poland, 
especially in relation to the migration-development nexus. Poland, by contrast, has 
generally been satisfied with the direction of the EU’s development policy, especially since 
the EU itself has been putting a greater emphasis on managing migration and supporting 
the private sector through development funds. 
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The analyses focuses on the years between 2015 (when the Law and Justice Party came 
into power in Poland) and 2018, although some links to earlier developments will be made 
in the case of Hungary, given how Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party has been in power since 
2010. The main sources of data include government documents, political statements and 
media reporting. We use the term development cooperation in a relatively broad sense, to 
refer to all EU policies which include the transfer of resources and expertise between the 
EU and less developed countries. Thus, beyond the EU’s development cooperation 
activities with the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, we also include areas like the 
EU’s Neighbourhood Policy or its democracy promotion efforts. Development cooperation 
also touches on a number of other EU policy areas, among which migration policy has 
gained recent prominence.  
 
The paper contributes to the literature on European disintegration by examining the 
processes eroding loyalty and potentially leading to various forms of EU disintegration in 
a policy area which has received relatively little attention. Furthermore, the paper also 
highlights key issues for the EU development policy literature, emphasizing the fact that 
the policy has not performed well in terms of integrating the new member states, which is 
a source of internal challenge in need of a solution.  
 
The following section discusses the paper’s conceptual framework, followed by an analysis 
of the factors, which may have eroded the loyalty of Hungary and Poland towards EU 
development cooperation. The subsequent section compares the recent actions of the two 
countries in the EU’s development policymaking processes, with the aim of identifying 
whether lower degrees of loyalty have led to more voice or even partial exits. The final 
section provides concluding remarks. 
 
 
EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY IN EU POLICYMAKING 
While the literature on the EU has paid much attention to explaining the processes of 
integration, it has only recently started to develop theoretical accounts of disintegration, 
driven by challenges such as the Greek debt crisis and Brexit. Most agree that existing 
theories of integration ‘in reverse’ do not provide sufficient explanations for disintegration 
processes (Webber 2014; Jones 2018). A number of new approaches have therefore 
emerged to explain disintegration, using a variety of explanatory variables and theoretical 
backgrounds (Vollard 2014; Webber 2014; Jactenfuchs and Kasack 2017; Jones 2018). A 
particularly fruitful approach, focusing on explaining the actions of member states who are 
dissatisfied with the workings of an EU policy area, adapts Albert Hirschmann’s (1970) 
framework of exit, voice and loyalty (Vollard 2014; Jactenfuchs and Kasack 2017).  
 
Jachtenfuchs and Kasack (2017) argue that member states face a trade-off between 
national autonomy and collective problem-solving. A member state may either try to 
influence an EU policy in order to ensure that it reflects its preferences (voice), or it may 
decide not to be part of a collective policy effort (exit). Voice can take many forms centred 
around constructive participation in EU policymaking processes, including techniques 
aimed at achieving influence such as coalition building, framing, or persuasion (Panke 
2010). In the extreme (and depending on the rules of the policy area), a member state 
may block or veto a decision. Similarly, exit from a policy area is not a binary in/out choice 
either. A full exit would represent a situation when a member state opts out fully from an 
EU policy area, such as Denmark’s opt-out from the EU’s military policies. A partial exit 
refers to situations that are less drastic (Vollard 2014): a member state refusing to comply 
with specific decisions made in the policy area, or limiting its own participation without 
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complete withdrawal. A partial exit represents a form of EU disintegration, although the 
member state does not receive a formal opt-out. 
Hirschmann’s (1970) third concept, loyalty, is conceptualized as a variable which affects  
the choice between voice and exit. Organisations may foster loyalty among members, who 
thus remain committed to the organisation, even though they are dissatisfied with its 
performance. Loyal members may passively accept the status quo, while less loyal ones 
are more likely to use voice or even exit. However, in the dynamic setting of EU 
policymaking, with shifting national and European interests, there is rarely a stable status 
quo. Member states engaged in EU policy processes constantly need to make decisions 
regarding their actions, ranging from being passive, through using various forms of voice, 
to a (partial) exit. The decision they make along this continuum can be seen as a function 
of loyalty. Using voice is part of the normal functioning of EU policy processes, and if done 
constructively and within the written and unwritten rules of the integration, it is actually a 
manifestation of loyalty rather than a sign of eroding loyalty. Only opting for stronger 
forms of voice such as vetoing decisions, or a partial exit would be associated with lower 
levels of loyalty. Furthermore, to note, passivity does not necessarily signal a high degree 
of loyalty in the case of the EU, but can also mean a lack of interest from the member 
state in the given policy. 
 
Loyalty towards the EU can decrease for three reasons. First, as Webber (2014) argues, a 
significant driver of disintegration comes from the domestic politics of member states, 
mainly due to the upsurge in anti-EU, national/populist politics, or shifts towards values 
which are less compatible with those embodied in EU level policies. The general shift in 
domestic politics can spill over to specific policy areas, which may be adapted to reflect 
the broader national political discourse. This adaptation, in turn, will decrease loyalty 
towards EU level solutions, as these are based on values no longer accepted by the 
member state. This makes the usage of stronger forms of voice or a partial exit more 
likely. Furthermore, a member state may also feel the need to signal its new values, 
especially towards domestic audiences, and is more likely to select policy areas for this 
where greater confrontation is not perceived as costly. Second, even without a shift values, 
member states may still experience an erosion in their loyalty towards the policy area if 
they continuously find it difficult to ensure that EU policies reflect their interests. In the 
extreme, the perceived lack of influence may even lead to perceptions on how the rules of 
the policy area discriminate against them (Jones 2018). This can lead to a gradual 
disappearance of loyalty towards collective problem solving. Third, loyalty towards a policy 
area may decrease due to the emergence of alternatives for managing it. An alternative 
to collective action is acting alone, and the perceived effectiveness of this may increase, 
providing member states with incentives to argue for the renationalization of the policy. 
Other, non-EU, collective solutions may also emerge which member states perceive as 
more effective. These three factors may co-exist simultaneously, in which case the erosion 
of loyalty is expected to be the strongest.  
 
The remainder of this section illustrates how this approach is relevant for the case of EU 
development policy. Development policy is a shared parallel competence within the EU: 
member states retain their bilateral development policies, but the European Commission 
(EC) provides aid as well, as an additional donor. The EC is also charged with coordinating 
the bilateral development activities of members. Most of the acquis communautaire aimed 
to promote this coordination is based on non-binding, soft law instruments (Carbone 2007: 
50). Many decisions, usually in the forms of Council Conclusions, do not carry legal weight, 
and enforcement mechanisms are weak. None the less, given how the development acquis 
often emphasizes key norms and principles, giving it symbolic and moral weight, less loyal 
member states may have reasons to block them before they are accepted.  
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Given the non-binding nature of most of the development acquis, and the fact that most 
member states have been selective in aligning their development activities with these rules 
(Carbone and Keijzer 2016; Delputte et al. 2016), conceptualizing a partial exit is difficult. 
Not applying a specific rule is clearly a harsh criteria, which would lead to large number of 
partial exit instances. A partial exit would thus need to be conceptualized as a systematic 
and vocal refusal to implement or engage with the development acquis. In essence, a 
partial exit is a situation in which a member state’s international development policy is 
only minimally informed, or not informed at all by the development acquis, and the 
member state clearly acknowledges its opposition to these rules.  
 
International development cooperation is often viewed as a technical and ‘depoliticized’ 
issue area, which rarely enters political discourses in the CEE countries (Horký-Hlucháň 
2015). While the rise of nationalist populism and anti-EU politics have been well 
documented for Poland and Hungary (Krekó and Enyedi 2018), the degree to which these 
affect such a technical policy area is unclear. Development cooperation could remain 
relatively isolated from the broader political direction of the country, and thus rising 
illiberalism would not (automatically) translate into a lower degree of loyalty towards EU 
development policy. In order to get a sense of the impact of these domestic changes, the 
effect of changing domestic politics on the bilateral development cooperation of the two 
countries needs to be examined. Populist/illiberal shifts in bilateral development policies 
can take several forms. Discourses in the policy area may start to reflect the broader 
discourses used by the government, especially in terms of putting national interests first 
and combating external threats to society. Practice may also shift to better serve 
government goals, such as through a greater emphasis on the promotion of economic 
interests, the selection of partner countries, or reducing efforts in areas, which are less 
compatible with government rhetoric, such as democracy promotion. Of course, many 
donors talk about economic motivations in international development, or the need to 
combat certain external threats, and this does not make their development policies 
populist/illiberal. What matters is whether there is a push to systematically align 
development policy with government rhetoric and practice. 
 
The lack of long-term influence in the EU can also erode loyalty. Thus, we need to examine 
how Poland and Hungary have engaged with EU development policy in the past, what 
results they have had achieved in uploading their preferences, and how this engagement 
has impacted the two countries. There is a substantial literature examining the 
Europeanization of member states in development policy (Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi 
2014; Orbie and Carbone 2016), which can provide insights in this regard. Finally, possible 
alternatives to EU development policy may also decrease loyalty. Member states may see 
the relative effectiveness of bilateral development efforts increase in terms of dealing with 
new challenges. A renationalization of development policy would allow them to use their 
aid more freely. There are also a number of other multilateral arrangements, including the 
relatively recent proliferation of trust funds, which allow bilateral donors to retain much 
stronger control over their contributions than in case of traditional multilateral (Reinsberg 
2017).  
 
We now turn to examining whether there is reason to expect an erosion of loyalty in the 
case of Poland and Hungary, along these three dimensions. 
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THE EROSION OF LOYALTY? 
Rising Nationalism in Bilateral Development Cooperation 
In Hungary, the right-wing Fidesz party led by Viktor Orbán has been in power since 2010. 
The actions of Orbán’s governments and Hungary’s slide towards ‘illiberal democracy’ have 
been well documented in the literature (see e.g. Greskovits 2015; Krekó and Enyedi 2018). 
Many of these actions, including regulation of the media and the gradual ‘taming’ of 
opposition media outlets, attacks on the judiciary, electoral reform, the undoing of checks 
and balances on the executive, or legislation against non-governmental organisations have 
received heavy international criticism (see e.g. Venice Commission 2015). In September 
2018, the European Parliament voted to start disciplinary action against Hungary over 
breaches of the EU's core values, under Article 7 of the TEU. The government framed 
international criticism as unjustified and ignorant attacks against Hungary, and portrayed 
itself as standing up for the country. 
 
The shift away from Europe was reflected in the Orbán government’s foreign policy as well. 
Introduced in 2011 and entitled ‘Global Opening’, the government’s foreign policy aimed 
to diversify Hungary’s EU-centric external relations, especially towards emerging 
economies (Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011). The main goals were clearly 
economic: increasing Hungarian exports and generating new business links. The policy 
shift included opening new embassies and a number of high profile visits in various 
countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, which had previously been neglected by 
Hungarian diplomacy (Tarrósy and Vörös 2014). A sub-component of the Global Opening 
policy, entitled Eastern Opening, specifically aimed at strengthening relations with 
countries East of Hungary, especially Russia and China. The Orbán government has 
developed a particularly close relationship with Russia, most clearly manifested in the fact 
that Russia’s state owned nuclear energy firm was awarded a contract to build two new 
reactors in Hungary, funded by a loan from Russia. 
 
The Global Opening policy also led the government to embrace bilateral development 
cooperation much more strongly than its predecessors did. Orbán’s government carried 
out a number of reforms, including the enactment of Hungary’s first law and strategy on 
development cooperation in 2014 (Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot 2015). The government also 
committed itself to increasing funding for bilateral aid. The main motivation for increased 
interest in the policy was to use it to promote Hungarian exports to emerging and 
developing economies (Tétényi 2018), serving the goals of the Global Opening policy. The 
government significantly increased the number of scholarships for students from 
developing countries wanting to study in Hungary (from 6.2 million USD in 2014 to 23.8 
in 2017), and also increased funding for concessional loans for infrastructure projects in 
developing countries, tied to procurement from Hungarian companies. In 2016 alone, the 
government signed new loan agreements with Laos (30 million USD), Mongolia (25 million 
USD) and Vietnam (60 million EUR) (Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
2017). 
 
The European refugee crisis of 2015 led to the most significant confrontation between 
Hungary and the EU, and is relevant for Hungary’s bilateral development cooperation, as 
well as its engagement with the EU’s development policy. Hungary closed its Southern 
border towards refugees in 2015, and labelled all arrivals as economic migrants who were 
not eligible for asylum protection, regardless of their actual individual circumstances. The 
country opposed any mandatory redistribution scheme of refugees among EU member 
states(Washington Post 2017), and the government whipped up anti-immigrant 
sentiments and even organized a referendum about accepting the EU’s refugee reallocation 
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quotas in October 2016. In 2017, Hungary launched a new bilateral aid programme 
entitled Hungary Helps, with the declared aim of addressing the root causes of migration. 
The programme claimed to focus on supporting Christian minority communities in conflict 
zones, through providing post-conflict rehabilitation assistance. The emphasis on Christian 
solidarity was in line with the government’s ideology. The government also organized a 
series of international conferences on the persecution of Christians (Orbán 2019), and 
funded reports on the topic (Kaló and Ujházi 2018). Little is known however about the 
exact financial resources devoted to the Hungary Helps programme, and most likely the 
purpose of its existence is to show that Hungary is taking bilateral initiatives which back 
up its anti-migrant rhetoric.  
 
In Poland, the nationalist-populist Law and Justice Party (PiS) won the elections in October 
2015, and quickly began challenging the EU institutions. Changes in the Constitutional 
Tribunal beginning in December 2015 and subsequent reforms of the judiciary put the 
government in serious conflict with the EU. Poland became the first country against which 
the EC activated the Article 7 procedure in January 2018. Furthermore, due to the alleged 
violations of the principle of judicial independence, the EC referred Poland to the ECJ in 
September 2018 (European Commission 2018). Together with some other policy changes 
enacted by PiS relating to the public media, many in Western Europe started asking 
whether Poland is also building an illiberal democracy. Similarly to Hungary, the Polish 
government retaliated by accusing the EU of discrimination and double standards. 
 
The PiS government, despite declaring a cut-off from the foreign policies of the previous 
government, showed a great deal of continuity in the field of development cooperation. 
This was manifested in three dimensions. First, the government continued to work along 
the lines of the Multiannual Programme of Development Cooperation for 2016-2020, 
adopted by its predecessor in 2015 (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016). Second, 
Poland has continued to regard development assistance as a foreign policy tool, serving 
Polish national interests. Similarly to Hungary, there was an emphasis on ensuring closer 
alignment between aid and economic diplomacy. The new government signed new loan 
agreements with Angola (60 million USD), Mongolia (50 million EUR) and Vietnam (250 
million EUR) in 2017 (Polish Ministry of Finance 2019). Just like Hungary, it also expanded 
scholarships, which’s value more than doubled from 2016 to 2017 (to approximately 70 
million EUR), emerging as the single largest modality of bilateral aid (Polish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2018: 23). Finally, the third element of continuity was the underestimation 
of development cooperation in general. While in Hungary we clearly see evidence of 
increasing government attention to development policy, in Poland the limited presence of 
the issue in political debates and the low level of financing has not changed. The PiS 
government made no clear commitment for increasing aid, and any increases that did 
happen went to issues linked to the refugee crisis and contributions to development banks.  
 
However, there are also departures from the past under the PiS government. The first, as 
in the case of Hungary, relates to migration policy: Poland also rejected the EU’s refugee 
relocation scheme and has blocked any attempts to reform European migration policy. 
Like Hungary, the PiS government also felt that in order to make this rhetoric credible, it 
needed to prioritize humanitarian assistance to the Middle East as a tool of addressing root 
causes of refugee crisis. During the height of the refugee crisis and in midst of the Polish 
election campaign in September 2015, PiS leader Jarosław Kaczynski suggested increasing 
assistance to refugee camps in the Middle East (Sejm of the Republic of Poland 2015: 14). 
After PiS’ victory, this approach became the official position of the new government, 
claiming that help must be provided where the problem starts (Rzeczpospolita  2016). 
Government officials prioritised assistance to Christian communities, though this 
commitment was less visible in actual activities. The new emphasis on the Middle East is 
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also clear from the number of official visits to the region and the increase in funding. An 
increase in Polish humanitarian aid duly followed, increasing from 6 million USD in 2015 
to over 43 million USD in 2017, although the vast majority of this increase represented 
contributions to the EU’s various migration-related trust funds. 
 
A second major change by PiS was a lower focus on democracy assistance and transition 
support, areas which in the past have been seen as Poland’s comparative advantages in 
development cooperation (Pospieszna 2014). PiS politicians had major reservations about 
the successes and achievements of the Polish transformation post-1989. In addition, being 
a subject of external pressure from the EU, the PiS government had more hesitations 
about interfering in the internal affairs of other countries through democracy support. As 
a result, democracy assistance was downgraded in Poland’s development cooperation. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs also became much less vocal about democracy support as Polish 
added value in development cooperation (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018: 2). 
 
In summary, we see evidence of a populist/illiberal shift in the bilateral development 
cooperation policies of both countries, with anti-EU elements. Both countries made 
increasing use of their bilateral aid to promote economic objectives, and Poland has scaled 
back on its normative commitment to supporting democracy. Both countries have also 
used bilateral aid as a vehicle to back-up their anti-migration rhetoric, claiming that the 
root causes of migration need to be addressed. A key difference however between the two 
countries is that Hungary seems to have integrated bilateral development cooperation 
more strategically into its foreign policy. In Poland however, there seems to be a surprising 
continuity with the past. While development policy clearly did not remain isolated from the 
broader political direction of either country, the impact in Hungary seems larger, 
potentially leading to a greater erosion in loyalty towards EU development cooperation. 
 
 
Influence and Europeanization 
Most CEE countries created bilateral international development policies during the run-up 
to their accession to the EU (Carbone 2004). A significant literature has emerged to 
examine what impacts EU membership has had on these policies, mostly using a 
framework based on the theory of Europeanization (Horký 2010; Timofejevs Henriksson 
2013; Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi 2014). There have also been efforts to examine the 
influence the CEE states have had on the EU’s development cooperation (Hellmeyer 2015), 
especially in terms of uploading their preferences to the EU’s development agenda. We 
examine these two processes below. 
 
The Europeanization of development cooperation in the CEE countries has been ‘shallow’ 
(Horký 2012a), and the CEE countries have been ‘reluctant’ donors in terms of their 
engagement with the EU’s development acquis (Lightfoot and Szent-Iványi 2014). Member 
states will only Europeanize their policies, i.e. adopt the norms and rules into their 
domestic policies if either they face strong material incentives to do so, or they gradually 
internalize them due to socialization. Given how most of the EU’s development acquis is 
in the form of soft law, the EU was not able to put pressure on member states to comply. 
Compliance has costs, thus the rationalist approach focusing on material incentives points 
towards weak Europeanization. There is also little evidence of CEE member state officials 
being socialized into accepting the EU’s development policy norms and values (Lightfoot 
and Szent-Ivanyi 2014). They have clearly pay lip service to these at times, but there is 
also evidence of rhetoric which shows that these values have not been internalized (Paragi 
2011).  
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The conclusions on the low degree of Europeanization seem to be shared for all CEE 
countries, and it is difficult to pinpoint any differences between Hungary and Poland. In 
fact, both countries have generally been among the laggards even within the region in 
terms of adopting the EU’s development acquis (Szent-Iványi and Lightfoot 2015: 80). 
Neither country made significant efforts to raise its aid spending towards the EU’s target 
of 0.33% of GNI, nor did they adapt EU recommendations relating to the quality of their 
aid (such as untying aid, reducing the number of partner countries, or focusing more aid 
on the least developed). If any effect of Europeanization could be seen beyond the 
rhetorical level, it would be negative – over the years, both Poland and Hungary learned 
how to ignore EU soft laws. Rather than making the two countries ‘good’ European donors, 
past experiences may in fact have encouraged them to break away even more from 
European standards. The EU has failed to foster loyalty to development cooperation 
through Europeanization in either country. 
 
In terms of influencing the EU’s development cooperation, the CEE countries never 
formulated any grand visions on how they would like this policy area evolve. This general 
disinterest however did not mean that they had no ambition to shape EU development 
cooperation. Due to perceptions that development cooperation is mainly the field of the 
Western member states and CEE actors cannot compete with Western actors in winning 
EU development contracts and grants, the CEE countries mainly focused on trying to carve 
out niches for themselves (Szent-Iványi 2014). First, due to their own historical 
experience, they aimed to position themselves as having unique expertise in political and 
economic transition processes (Horký 2012b). This led countries like Poland, and to a 
lesser degree Hungary, to prioritize democracy support in their bilateral development 
cooperation. Second, the CEE countries argued that they are well placed to work with 
countries in the Eastern neighbourhood, due to a shared history as members of the Eastern 
bloc. Third, they aimed to get positive discrimination from the EU for CEE actors bidding 
for EU development funding, arguing that they are at a relative disadvantage due to their 
status as newcomers. 
 
Much of the lobbying in these areas was carried out jointly by the CEE countries (Non-
paper 2011), so it is difficult to identify specific successes for Hungary and Poland 
separately. In terms of joint successes, CEE transition experience, and the value it brings 
to EU development cooperation, received explicit mentions in key EU policy documents, 
such as the 2006 European Consensus on Development (Article 33). In order to 
operationalize this commitment, the EC started a project to map CEE transition experience, 
which resulted in the publication of the European Transition Compendium (ETC) in 2010. 
The ETC however never truly entered EU development policymaking (Hellmeyer 2015). 
Poland was especially vocal on democracy support, and it was during the Polish Presidency 
in 2011 when the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) was established, clearly 
seen as a success for Poland. Poland (together with Sweden) was also instrumental in the 
creation of the Eastern Partnership initiative in 2009 (Copsey and Pomorska 2014), 
however, this proved less of a transformative force on the EU’s development cooperation 
than anticipated, mainly due to mounting geopolitical tensions with Russia. CEE actors 
have also achieved some success in twinning projects in the Eastern Neighbourhood 
(Bossuyt and Panchuk 2017). The EU agreed to some ‘ring-fencing’ of funds for CEE actors 
for projects aimed at domestic development education and awareness raising. CEE actors 
however had trouble in bidding for even these ring-fenced amounts, and performed 
generally weakly in terms of winning EU funding for projects abroad (Szent-Iványi 2014). 
Contributions to the EU’s development budget were increasingly seen as ‘lost money’. 
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Following the 2015 European refugee crisis, both Hungary and Poland adopted hostile 
positions towards immigration, and has framed the issue in terms of national security and 
cultural identity. This not only led to confrontation with the EU through the refusal to 
accept refugee quotas, but also to stronger, and more politically visible efforts to influence 
EU development cooperation. The heads of government of the Visegrad Group (V4), a 
loose framework for cooperation between the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia, issued a joint statement in 2015, emphasizing the need to use aid to tackle the 
root causes of migration, calling on the EU to ‘mobilize the relevant resources’, and ensure 
that ‘their development assistance to countries of origin and of transit […] is well-targeted 
[…], both for preventing and fighting irregular migration as well as combating root causes 
of migration’ (Visegrad Group 2015). Poland has also committed itself to support and ‘take 
part in EU actions that lead to solving problems [of migration] at their sources’ (Polish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2017: 24). Given the general sense of crisis in the EU due to 
the surge in refugee flows, the V4 countries did not face an uphill battle in terms of getting 
these interests uploaded to the EU’s agenda. They were supportive of the Joint Valetta 
Action Plan and the creation of the EU’s migration-related trust funds in 2015, the EU 
Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis and the EU Emergency Trust Fund 
for Africa.  
 
Weak Europeanization and only limited influence points to a low degree of loyalty towards 
EU development cooperation. Poland, perhaps due to its larger weight in EU decision-
making, may have had relatively larger influence than Hungary, as evidenced by its role 
in creating the Eastern Partnership and the EED. This could mean that loyalty towards the 
EU’s development efforts may have eroded to a lesser degree in Poland than in Hungary, 
although given the PiS government’s decreasing emphasis on democracy promotion, one 
must be careful with such conclusions. Furthermore, both countries have lobbied for, and 
have welcomed the more recent shift in the EU’s development policy towards managing 
migration. This shift may have increased the relevance of development cooperation for the 
two countries, contributing to an increase in loyalty. 
 
Alternatives to EU Development Policy 
The loyalty of member states may also decrease if the relative attractiveness and 
perceived effectiveness of alternative solutions increases. Alternatives may include 
bilateral development cooperation or multilateral arrangements other than the EU. As 
discussed, both Hungary and Poland have been using more aid bilaterally to address the 
root causes of migration. Hungary created the Hungary Helps programme, while Poland 
increased its humanitarian assistance to the Middle East. Just how serious these efforts 
are, and how much they represent an alternative to EU development cooperation is 
questionable. Neither country has sufficient resources to achieve any kind significant 
impact that would reduce migratory pressures. These countries mainly expect the EU to 
increase funding for managing migration, and have clear perceptions about the limits of 
their bilateral funding (Visegrad Group 2015). Bilateral initiatives should therefore be seen 
as efforts by the governments to make their anti-migration rhetoric more credible, and do 
not represent a realistic alternative to joint EU funding. A closer look reveals that the 
resources devoted to new bilateral efforts are rather minimal. While the exact amounts 
devoted to the Hungary Helps programme are unclear, sporadic data on a government 
website indicate that around 6.3 million EUR were committed in 2017, and a further 5 
million EUR in 2018 (About Hungary 2019). Another government source mentions 25 
million EUR in total support for persecuted Christians, ‘directly enabling 35 thousand 
people to remain or return home within the framework of the Hungary Helps Programme’ 
(Kormany.hu 2019). The bilateral share of Poland’s humanitarian aid increases points to 
similarly modest amounts: only around 6.7 million EUR was delivered through Polish NGOs 
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and diplomatic missions (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018). These are relatively 
tokenistic amounts, especially when compared to the tied loan agreements both countries 
have recently signed with various developing countries.  
 
There is some evidence of both countries making slightly greater use of multilateral 
arrangements outside of the EU. Poland has increased its contributions to UN agencies 
between 2015 and 2017, both countries began contributing to regional development banks 
in 2016 (OECD 2018), and both have joined the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank. However, these increases are relatively modest, and not out of line with the general 
trends of the multilateral development cooperation policies of the two countries. 
 
An interesting situation is represented by the EU’s migration related trust funds. As 
mentioned, both Poland and Hungary were supportive of these initiatives. While these 
funds were created by the EU, and can thus be conceptualized as new aid modalities, they 
may also be thought of alternatives to the EU’s traditional development cooperation 
processes. Both funds aim explicitly at managing migration, and have their own 
governance mechanisms with lower oversight from the EC. Each contributing member 
state receives one vote in board of the funds, and a minimum contribution of 3 million EUR 
also provides a seat in the operational committee. These features may make some 
member states see these trust funds as more attractive in terms of achieving influence 
than the EU’s general development cooperation processes. The Visegrad countries jointly 
contributed 3.14 million euros to the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, which gave them 
a joint seat in the Fund’s operational committee. Hungary and Poland both contributed 3 
million euros each to the Syria Trust Fund (European Union 2015), with Poland contributing 
an additional 1.2 million in 2017 (European Commission 2017). Both countries have also 
clearly expressed that they see the goals of the trust funds fitting very well into their 
development cooperation strategies. While amounts contributed are not large compared 
to the total values of these funds, the fact that both countries made efforts to ensure that 
they have a say in how these are allocated shows that they have taken them seriously. 
Due to their close links to the EU however, including the fact that the EC implements the 
projects approved under the trust funds, it is unclear whether they are seen as alternatives 
by the two countries which would erode loyalty towards EU development cooperation. 
 
It is difficult to argue that either Poland or Hungary see a clear alternative to EU 
development cooperation. They clearly do not have the resources to achieve any 
meaningful impact through bilateral development cooperation, and there is no strong 
evidence of turning towards other multilateral agencies either: contributions to the EU still 
make up the bulk of the total foreign aid expenditure of both countries.  
 
LESS LOYALTY, MORE VOICE? 
There are clearly processes at work in both countries which erode loyalty towards EU 
development cooperation, although these are not uniformly strong. In case of Hungary, 
there is evidence of the Fidesz government’s nationalist and anti-EU rhetoric entering 
bilateral development policy. There is very little indication that EU membership would have 
had any socialization effects on Hungary’s development cooperation, and while Hungary 
has managed to have some impact on EU development policy, these have not been large, 
and reflect collective CEE efforts. The emerging picture is slightly different for Poland. 
Poland’s bilateral development policy has shown greater continuity, although there is also 
evidence of the impact of illiberalism in the form of decreasing emphasis on democracy 
promotion. Poland has been more influential than Hungary, although it is just as difficult 
to identify any socialization effects. Based on these differences, we expect Hungary to 
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have become more vocal in EU development policymaking. This section analyses the 
recent actions of the two countries in these processes. 
 
There is evidence that Hungary has increasingly been acting as a ‘trouble maker’ in EU 
development policy. Its opposition towards migration has translated into extreme hostility 
towards any positive mentions of the issue in EU documents. As stated in a report by the 
Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2017: 15):  
 
Hungary places a strong emphasis on ensuring that the EU separates discussions on 
refugees eligible for protection and economic migrants. Not all EU countries think the 
same in all development-related topics, which became evident during the elaboration 
of the New European Consensus, the backbone of the EU’s international development 
cooperation policy. While all members supported the goals of international 
development and criteria aimed at increasing effectiveness, approaches to migration 
divided the member states. While finalizing the document, Hungary was unable to 
accept any references to the positive impacts of migration on destination countries.  
 
Contestation of positive images of migration was visible in a number of Hungarian actions 
on the EU level. In April 2018, Hungary vetoed the text of the Marrakesh Political 
Declaration between the EU and African countries on migration and development – in the 
end, Hungary was the only EU member not to sign it (444.hu 2018a). Hungary also vetoed 
the EU’s negotiating mandate for the post-Cotonou negotiations in May 2018, arguing that 
it speaks too favourably of migration, and demanded removing references to legal routes 
for migration. Hungary was the only member state to oppose the mandate (Euractiv 2018). 
Furthermore, Hungary was the first member state to break away from the EU’s joint 
position on the United Nations’ Global Compact on Migration in June 2018, a non-binding 
instrument laying down principles on managing migration. The government argued that 
‘migration is an unfavourable and dangerous process […], at odds with the country’s 
security interests’ (Gatti 2018). 
 
These are all clear instances of using an extreme form of voice, which had previously not 
characterized Hungary’s participation in EU development policy, or even EU policymaking 
more generally. Previously, Hungary only opposed EU declarations if it was not alone in 
doing so. The shifts towards acting alone became evident in other areas of EU foreign 
policy as well in 2018: for example, Hungary was alone in opposing a declaration 
condemning China on human rights (444.hu 2018b). Hungary has also been perhaps one 
of the most vocal critics of sanctions against Russia in the aftermath of the annexation of 
Crimea. The government has also been making the development of closer ties with Ukraine 
more difficult: Orbán’s government, has taken a distinctly pro-Russian angle after the 
Maidan revolution (Krekó and Szicherle 2018). Relations with Ukraine deteriorated 
especially after the country passed a controversial education law in 2017, which affects 
minority languages users (including ethnic Hungarians living in the Transcarpathia region 
of Ukraine) negatively. Peter Szijjártó, Hungary’s foreign minister, stated that ‘Hungary 
will block and veto all steps in the European Union, which […] would bring Ukraine closer 
to the European integration’ (Valasz.hu 2017). While there has been no evidence of 
Hungary living up to this promise, Hungary’s actions have been seen as disproportionate 
and benefiting Russia (Kreko and Szicherle 2018). 
 
Poland has acted much less controversially in EU development cooperation and related 
policies, with rather little evidence of a stronger Polish voice or partial exits. While Poland 
also broke away from the EU position on the Global Compact on Migration and did not sign 
the document, it was more a follower in this regard after Hungary and several other 
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member states broke away (Gatti 2018). Poland eventually voted against the Compact in 
the UN General Assembly and did not support a separate Global Compact on Refugees 
either. However, Polish objections to the migration related issues in EU development policy 
documents and positions where much softer than those of Hungary. Poland gave some 
technical support to Hungary relating to its criticism of migration and seems to have ‘felt 
comfortable’ hiding behind Hungary during the negotiations of the EC’s mandate for the 
post-Cotonou agreement.  
 
Paradoxically, the refugee crisis in 2015 and its impacts on EU policy had a positive 
influence on Poland’s position within EU development cooperation. The EU’s approach to 
migration shifted from a welcoming to a more deterrent approach after 2016, which gave 
an impression to Polish officials that the EU was aligning itself with the Polish position. The 
failure of the refugee relocation scheme and greater EU focus on addressing the ‘root 
causes of migration’ in development policy strengthened the narrative that the CEE 
countries were right all along. The securitization of EU development policy was a welcome 
change for the Polish government, which had always regarded aid as a foreign policy tool. 
After rejecting any substantial reform of migration policy at the European Council in June 
2018, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki stated that ‘we have succeeded in 
convincing our partners that the refugee relocation scheme cannot force any country to 
admit refugees against its sovereign will. […] The position of Poland is now the position of 
the entire EU’ (Deon.pl 2018). While this statement may be exaggerated, there has clearly 
been convergence between the Polish and European approaches to using foreign aid as 
tool of migration control. As opposed to Hungary, which thought that the EU did not go far 
enough, Poland was satisfied with this convergence. Furthermore, Poland has been much 
less of ‘troublemaker’ in other areas of EU external relations and development policy than 
Hungary.  
 
There were further changes in EU development policy which were in line with Poland’s 
interests. For instance, the growing European discourse on the stronger engagement of 
the private sector aligned with the multiannual strategy of Polish Aid (Polish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2015). This gave an opportunity for Poland to justify its own support for 
Polish businesses in development cooperation. Poland welcomed the proposal for the 
European External Investment Plan and was one of the biggest donors for the European 
Resilience Initiative of the European Investment Bank. Poland saw it as a success that the 
New European Consensus on Development recognized the Eastern Partnership countries 
and Middle Income Countries, where most of Polish bilateral aid goes, as important 
partners for the EU. 
 
There is one final area in development cooperation where both Poland and Hungary have 
been increasingly using their voice: Sexual Reproductive Health Rights (SRHR). Both 
governments argue that this concept is not clearly defined and can be a cover for opening 
the way for supporting abortion, same-sex marriage, or adoption of children by same-sex 
couples. Both claim to protect ‘traditional’ family values, although in rather archaic forms, 
which fits into their proclaimed illiberal/nationalist ideologies, and their adversity towards 
‘gender ideology’ (Vida 2019). Poland and Hungary played a role in softening the language 
and propositions on SRHR in the negotiating mandate for the post-Cotonou agreement, as 
well as the New European Consensus on Development, making this a further area where 
they are using a stronger voice.1 However, there is little data as to how systematic the 
opposition to these issues is from these countries, and it has clearly been less emphasized 
than migration. A report sponsored by the Hungarian government attempted to link the 
two issues, arguing that the way international organizations promote sexual education 
programs amounts to the persecution of Christians for their beliefs (Muller 2019). 
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Comparing the recent actions of Hungary and Poland in EU development cooperation 
processes supports our expectation that Hungary has become more likely to use extreme 
forms of voice, although there is no evidence for partial exit. Development cooperation 
has not emerged as a sticking point in Poland’s relations with the EU, and Poland is acting 
in a less confrontational manner than Hungary. In fact, shifts in the EU’s development 
policy have been in Poland’s favour, lending the government an argument that it can wield 
influence in the EU. The fact that Hungary remained confrontational indicates that it would 
have liked the EU to be even more radical. Hungary has emerged as an internal challenger 
to the EU’s development policy, while Poland less so.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has examined how the rise of illiberalism in Hungary and Poland has affected 
their actions in EU development cooperation. Using a framework based on Hirschmann’s 
(1970) concepts of voice, exit and loyalty, the paper argued that a number of processes 
may have eroded Hungary and Poland’s loyalty towards EU development cooperation, 
making them more likely to use extreme forms of voice, and potentially even partially exit 
from the policy area. We argued that the erosion of loyalty could be caused by increasing 
discrepancy between the values embedded in EU development cooperation and those in 
bilateral development policy; a lack of Europeanization and low influence in shaping the 
policy; and the emergence of alternative solutions. Hungary’s bilateral development policy 
has become more nationalist/illiberal than Poland’s, where there is a strong degree of 
continuity. While neither country has been successfully Europeanized into the norms of 
the common development policy, Poland may have developed a stronger sense of loyalty 
due to the fact that it has had more success in influencing the policy area than Hungary. 
Finally, it is difficult to argue that there are any true alternatives to the EU’s development 
policy in terms of addressing collective problems, such as the migration-development 
nexus. Both countries have made greater use of bilateral aid to address the root causes 
of migration, but these efforts are mostly symbolic.  
 
The framework explains the differences between Hungary’s and Poland’s actions within EU 
development policy well. While partial exits would perhaps be a strong expectation, there 
is reason to expect Hungary to embrace stronger forms of voice due to how its loyalty 
towards the policy may have been eroded more than that of Poland’s. This is supported 
by recent evidence: Hungary has indeed been using stronger forms of voice, including 
vetoes, in EU development policymaking. Poland on the other hand seems content with 
the policy area, especially since it has shifted towards placing a greater emphasis on 
managing migration and supporting businesses. In other words, the modus operandi of 
the EU has shifted closer to Poland’s preferences, making the erosion of loyalty less likely. 
Indeed, Polish officials have communicated this as evidence of Polish influence. While these 
changes were in Hungary’s favour as well, the government seemed to be pushing for even 
more radical change. It may also be using development policy for other political purposes, 
e.g. signalling to other member states that it is ready to act in a more disruptive manner, 
should the EU become tougher in challenging the authoritarian nature of Orbán’s 
governance. In case of Poland, the convergence with EU development policy should not 
be seen as an effect of successful Europeanisation. To the contrary, the Polish approach 
emerged in opposition to the EU’s refugee relocation scheme. Other changes, such as the 
marginalisation of democracy promotion, are home-grown phenomena, linked to the 
ideology of PiS.  
 
EU development cooperation has provided an important, negative lesson for Hungary and 
Poland. Over the years, both countries learned how to ignore soft laws of EU in this area 
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and pursued a selective internalisation of EU norms and priorities. This experience may 
have emboldened them, especially Hungary, to act more vocally in the policy area, and 
may have also encouraged them to break free from European standards in other areas as 
well. 
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